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Diasporas for Peace: Patterns, Trends and Potential of Long-distance Diaspora 
Involvement in Conflict Settings. Case Studies from the Horn of Africa 
(DIASPEACE) is a three-year research project looking into how diaspora groups 
can foster peace and development in their countries of origin. 
DIASPEACE seeks to generate policy-relevant, evidence-based knowledge on 
how exiled populations from conflict regions play into the dynamics of peace 
and conflict in their countries of origin. In a globalised world such diaspora have 
become new forces shaping the interactions between countries, regions and 
continents. In the mainstream literature, diaspora are often seen to fuel conflict 
and exacerbate tensions through radical mobilisation along ethnic and religious 
lines. New research findings, however, show that diaspora groups are playing an 
increasingly prominent role in peace and reconciliation processes. In DIASPEACE 
the focus is on positive initiatives, while keeping in mind also the non-intended 
and negative impacts.
The project has an empirical focus on diaspora networks operating in Europe, 
which extend their transnational activities to the Horn of Africa. This is a region 
where decades of violent conflict have resulted in state collapse and the dispersal 
of more than two million people. The project involves six partners from Europe 
and two from the Horn of Africa and is based on field research conducted in both 
Europe and Africa.
DIASPEACE aims to: a) devise and test methodologies of multi-sited comparative 
research and to develop the conceptual framework for researching migrant 
political transnationalism in a conflict context; b) facilitate interaction between 
diaspora and other stakeholders in the Europe and in the Horn of Africa; c) 
provide policy input on how to better involve diaspora in conflict resolution and 
peace-building interventions, and how to improve coherence between security, 
development and immigration policies. 
DIASPEACE consists of five main research components:
– Defining joint analytical tools and research methodologies; 
– Providing a comparative assessment of transnational diaspora networks 
from the Horn of Africa and their interfaces with European civil society and 
state institutions; 
– Case studies of diaspora as agents of conflict and peace from the Horn of 
Africa; 
– Interaction between European institutions and diasporas in conflict 
resolution and peace building; 
– Synthesis and dissemination of the research findings and identification of 
further research directions. 
The project aims to generate new knowledge to better understand diaspora’s 
potentials, expectations and experiences as bridge builders between countries of 
residence and countries of origin. 
The project is funded by the European Commission within the 7th Framework 
Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement No. 217335.
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This discussion paper focuses on the engagement of diasporas in peacebuilding 
processes in their countries of origin. The main argument put forward in this 
paper is that, given certain conditions, diasporas carry a potential to fruitfully 
engage in the field of peacebuilding. After substantiating this claim with a critical 
discussion of literature and research insight, the issue is further addressed by 
identifying and collating a set of key criteria of “good practice” for constructive 
diaspora engagement. This is to help third parties identify diaspora organisations 
and groups that have the potential to engage transparently and in long-
term processes, while also presenting the capacity to foster the resolution, 
transformation and management of conflicts in their respective countries of origin. 
In an endeavour to strengthen cooperation between diaspora organisations and 
other actors, the aim of this discussion paper is therefore to offer to International 
Agencies, the European Union and its member states, Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) and other stakeholders an indicative tool that will assist 
them in the identification of potential cooperation partners within the diaspora 
community to work together in conflict settings. Given the particularly sensitive 
nature of interventions in this field, the suggested criteria take into account 
factors that are generally related to collaboration with diaspora organisations, 
as well as factors that take into account a specific concern for their engagement 
in peacebuilding. In addition, it is hoped that the criteria may also facilitate 
purposeful self-reflection among diaspora groups on how they operate and on 
new potential areas for engagement in their countries of origin.
In addressing the issues just outlined, this paper does not presume to be 
comprehensive and exhaustive. The considerations on which this paper is 
based are drawn from fieldwork carried out in a limited number of EU member 
states (namely the Netherlands, Finland, Italy, Germany and the UK) offering 
cross-country insight into the experiences of diaspora originating from the 
Horn of Africa (specifically Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea). The paper builds 
on some of the findings of the DIASPEACE research conducted under WP2 
(Warnecke et al. 2009 and Warnecke ed. 2010). The nature of the data informing 
this paper therefore calls for precaution in the generalisation of its claims. 
Some of the issues raised, however, are worthy of consideration beyond the 
national boundaries of the case-studies utilised. The DIASPEACE study has 
shown that diaspora organisations do not passively wait for third parties in the 
country of residence or of origin to reach out to them. Instead, they often initiate 
development projects in the countries of origin in a voluntary and single handed 
way, often without receiving any form of assistance. The self drive and innovation 
which is behind most of this voluntarism is captured by Newland and Patrick in 
their observation that “the dense web of ties between the diaspora and country 
of origin is, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the creation of individuals 
and groups acting on their own initiative, rather than a product of government 
intervention” (Newland and Patrick 2004, p. 17). It can be suggested, however, that 
enhanced collaboration between diaspora organisations and other actors would 
generate a more conducive environment for diaspora members to contribute to 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction in more meaningful ways.
This brief introduction is followed by a section of the paper that first discusses 
the broader issue of diaspora engagement in development, then looks more 
specifically at its peacebuilding potentials. The value added of engaging diaspora 
organisations in the process is explored here, as well as the extent to which their 
activities can be peace-relevant and contribute to peaceful transformation of 
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1 The DIASPEACE project adopts a broad definition of peacebuilding, which is inclusive of 
actions that directly address the peace process as well as actions that can indirectly promote 
and maintain long-term peace. This definition is further detailed later in the paper (p. 10 and 
footnote 3).
factors or root causes behind the conflict.1 This discussion is supported by case-
study examples drawn from the DIASPEACE research on Horn of Africa diaspora 
organisations and their activities, with an attempt to sketch out how the latter 
could underpin formal engagement in peacebuilding. Cross country experiences 
and cases of constructive diaspora engagement and development strategy are 
presented, to be used as examples from which lessons can be learnt.
The following section looks at some of the potential challenges to diaspora 
engagement. While acknowledging the importance of factors that derive from the 
specific situation and conditions in the countries of residence and origin, as well 
as of structural factors at the international level that may influence these country 
policies, this section wishes to focus primarily on factors that are directly related 
to diaspora organisations themselves. These diaspora-related factors pertaining 
to organisational capacity but also to modes and fields of intervention are, in fact, 
of key relevance for policy formulation and programme design when taking into 
account diaspora engagement in peacebuilding. 
The elements presented in the preceding two sections inspire a set of key criteria, 
which are illustrated next. These criteria are intended as a guide on the basis 
of which third parties can identify more specific indicators for the selection of 
diaspora organisations in view of their effective engagement in peacebuilding.
Finally, some conclusions are drawn by synthesising the main issues emerging 
from the discussion in the paper. Some of the limitations presented by the 
suggested criteria are recalled here, indicating possible paths for improvement 
by way of future research.
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2 For further discussion on the concept of diaspora see also Brah (1996) and Safran (1990). 
An overview of the use of the concept made within the DIASPEACE project is offered in 
Pirkkalainen and Abdile (2009).
The potential represented by migration and diasporas2 for the development of 
their countries of origin has increasingly become an issue of policy as well as 
research interest. “The transfers of social, financial and cognitive resources by 
migrants for the benefit of origin-country development have recently gained 
substantial attention in the ‘migration and development’ debate” (de Haas 2006, 
p. 8). A large body of literature on the migration-development nexus discusses 
the various ways in which sending countries benefit of financial remittances 
(Ratha and Shaw 2007), social remittances (Levitt 1998; Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 
2002), skills transfer (Brinkerhoff 2006a; Lowell et al. 2004; Skeldon 2005) and, 
more broadly, of diaspora engagement in social and community projects aiming 
at promoting development in countries of origin (Adepoju 2008; de Haas 2005; 
Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002). Direct diaspora engagement has, in fact, even been 
touted by some as a way of harnessing the diaspora potentials for contributing to 
development in their countries of origin that can integrate the efforts undertaken by 
other external actors such as development agencies (de Haas 2006; Gamlen 2008; 
Ionescu 2006; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; van Hear et al. 2004).
Despite a large bulk of research and theorisation, coupled with a strong policy 
interest in this field, a number of questions still remain unaddressed about how 
the engagement of diaspora organisations can favour the promotion of homeland 
development. This statement applies particularly in certain circumstances. The 
potential for homeland development remains unclear, for instance, in contexts 
that are characterised by conflict. In these cases, the interest for diaspora 
potentials needs to be taken a step further in order to address existing policy and 
strategy gaps in an effort to tap into the diaspora potentials for conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding (Mohamoud 2005a and 2005b). This holds particularly true 
in the case of many African countries. Recent years, in fact, have seen the 
emergence of large and significant African diaspora communities in Europe and 
elsewhere in the Western world. The African diaspora is however composed 
of extremely diversified groups originating from different parts of the African 
continent. Countries that have experienced political upheavals, dictatorships and 
civil wars or that are still experiencing ongoing conflicts have more representation 
in the diaspora compared to those living in a situation of peace and stability. This 
is a “phenomenon of the contemporary African diaspora which is largely the result 
of violent conflicts and wars that have flared up in many African countries since 
the early 1990s” (Mohamoud 2006, p. 2). With the examples of Somalia, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea and Sudan, the Horn of Africa represents a relevant region for a closer 
analysis of the links between migration and development in settings characterised 
by conflict.
Existing theorisation on the linkages between diasporas and conflict has more 
often focused on the problematic aspects of such a relationship, with migrants 
described as contributing to the transnationalisation of conflicts by engaging in 
them from a distance (Brinkerhoff 2006; Collier 2000; Demmers 2002; Duffield 
2002; Kaldor 2001). In recent years, however, a number of authors has started to 
challenge this assumption by looking also at the ways in which diaspora can play a 
positive role in the peacebuilding sphere (Cochraine 2007; Hansen 2008; Leroy and 
Mohan 2003; Mohamoud 2005a and 2005b; Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002; Orjuela 
2006; Østergaard-Nielsen 2006; Smith 2007; Zunzer 2004). In particular, diasporas 
Diaspora engagement and 
peacebuilding potential
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are believed to have an ability to contribute to peacebuilding by undertaking and 
promoting activities that aim at the sustainable transformation of structural conflict 
factors and patterns in all relevant social, economic and political spheres. Such 
an understanding of ‘peacebuilding’ presupposes a long-term commitment to a 
process both by local and external actors which simultaneously addresses both the 
material (infrastructural) and attitudinal (inter-group) level of conflict.3
The still limited research and theorisation on the positive side of diaspora 
engagement in peace processes is followed by a general lack of interest, on 
behalf of countries of residence, in exploring new opportunities that immigration 
from the Horn of Africa may pose to favour conflict resolution, reconstruction 
and development in the Region. Such a lack of interest is justified by general 
assumptions about the complex and ambiguous role of diasporas and exiles in 
conflicts in their countries of origin (Østergaard-Nielsen 2006). The influx of large 
numbers of refugees from the Horn of Africa has therefore led several European 
countries to largely link the diaspora to some of the past and ongoing conflict 
(Demmers 2002; Mohamoud 2006). It has been pointed out, for instance, that in 
policy discussions on conflict in Africa diasporas are mentioned only in passing 
and are more often referred to as negative agents in the process, without further 
substantiation (Mohamoud 2006). Nonetheless there are a few cases of studies on 
positive contributions of African diaspora groups that have been commissioned and 
used also by policy-makers (Bercovitch 2007; Ionescu 2006; Sheikh and 2009). 
Experiences in several European countries covered by the DIASPEACE project4 
reveal increasingly high levels of diasporas organising through various platforms 
for collective action. Diaspora organisations are however diverse in terms of their 
countries of origin, of the activities undertaken at both the national and international 
level, of their networks and organisational forms, hence they cannot be reduced to 
a singular collective actor (Østergaard-Nielsen 2006). More specifically, the ways 
in which the diasporas from the Horn of Africa organise are shaped by a number 
of factors, among which the historical connections with the country of origin, the 
degree of political stability in the country of origin, the level of social inclusion 
in the country of residence, education, degree and type of political and social 
consciousness. 
As observed also by many other sources, diaspora groups are numerous and 
they exhibit a high degree of spontaneous and independent efforts on behalf of 
individual migrants as well as of migrant organisations to contribute to homeland 
development (van Hear et al. 2004). According to Orozco, four critical factors enable 
the formation of a group into a diaspora. These include “the level of community – 
and particularly elite and activist – consciousness about the need or desire for a link 
with the country of origin; the homeland’s perceptions of emigrants; the outreach 
policies by governments in the homeland, and the existence of relationships 
between source and destination countries” (Orozco 2005, p. 5). These aspects 
are more discernable at the international level, as a location which also “enables 
them to mobilise substantial financial resources, extensive transnational networks, 
powerful international forces, and political connections that span the globe and 
through which they could make a difference to the situation in the country of 
3 For further insight into the definition of peacebuilding and in particular of the interpretation 
adopted within the DIASPEACE project see Warneke et al. (2009, pp. 10 – 11).
4 For an extensive discussion of the case studies and findings of this research see Warnecke (ed.) 
(2010).
Key criteria of “good practice” 
for constructive diaspora 
engagement in peacebuilding
Key criteria of “good practice” 
for constructive diaspora 
engagement in peacebuilding
9
origin for better or for worse in different respects” (Mohamoud 2006, p. 3). The 
transnational engagement with the country of origin therefore facilitates the 
creation and reinforcement of a diaspora commonality. This is also enhanced by 
the fact that the Horn of Africa diasporas like their counterparts from elsewhere 
endeavour through their “shared experiences to seek more meaningful forms of 
political participation, and the evolution of an increasingly globalised repertoire 
uniting outlooks and actions” (Cohen 1998, p. 9). In the case of conflict-derived 
diasporas, the fragmentation that has been observed, for instance, within the 
Somali diaspora is at times downplayed or even disappears when a common 
“enemy” is identified. DIASPEACE data has shown this to be the case, for 
instance, as regards the Ethiopian invasion. This does not mean to deny that 
fragmentation within diaspora groups does occur and remains undeniable.
In terms of peacebuilding, the diaspora and their organisations have been 
suggested as potential critical agents (Østergaard-Nielsen 2006; Mohamoud 
2006) who can and do make significant contributions to peacebuilding, conflict 
transformation and post-conflict reconstruction efforts in their respective 
countries of origin. This view is based on the notion that the diasporas and their 
organisations have better familiarity with their country of origin combined with 
life experiences in the countries of residence compared to other external players 
such as development agencies. Their potentials therefore lie in their linkages 
with countries of origin and their experiences as a diaspora in the countries of 
residence. At the transnational level, the diasporas also have the potentials to play 
a significant role in peacebuilding related activities as major stakeholders and part 
of the broader civil society organisations. This role is informed by the view that 
diaspora communities present an interesting facet of civil society in that they are 
neither wholly external nor internal, but somewhere between the two. This unique 
position therefore anchors the diaspora organisations as “a key part of civil society 
activism and they can play a number of roles in conflict and attempts to build 
peace within divided societies” (Cochrane 2007).
The extent to which diaspora potentials and activities can be translated into 
pragmatic measures that contribute to peaceful transformation of factors/
root causes behind the conflict is however an issue that still requires further 
investigation. Engaging the diaspora to promote conflict resolution (Lyons 2004; 
Mohamoud 2005b; Shain 2002), in fact, requires their activities to be actually 
peace relevant and to be undertaken with an aim of contributing to peaceful 
transformation of factors or root causes behind the conflict in the country of origin. 
Mohamoud, (2006, p. 5) suggests that there are four critical areas through which 
the diaspora interact with the country of origin dynamics that are of policy interest. 
These include remittances and conflict in the country of origin; diaspora political 
involvement in the country of origin; diaspora civic-oriented involvement in the 
country of origin and diaspora lobbying in the countries of residence.5 Although 
the four factors suggested by Mohamoud underpin much of diaspora engagement, 
the diaspora involvement in the country of origin can in fact take different forms, 
with diverse implications for social, economic and political development. As aptly 
described by Cassanelli (2001) the nexus between social, economic and political 
development “at home” and in the diaspora is a “dialectic relationship.” 
5 The last point suggests that diaspora engagement with the country of origin in a constructive 
and peace-relevant way can also take place indirectly through activities undertaken in the 
country of residence.
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This also means that “social remittances” (Levitt 1998)6  including attitudes that 
foster peaceful conflict resolution or democratic practices can only have a positive 
impact on the situation in the country of origin if they are firmly rooted in the 
diaspora (Tezare et al. 2006). 
In the country of origin, the diaspora can be involved in peacebuilding through 
direct political participation, for instance in nation-level peace conferences or 
electoral processes as was the case in Ethiopia in 2005 or in the recent Djibouti 
process concerning Somalia. The diaspora can also engage with the country of 
origin through civil society organisations that operate at the local, national and 
international levels. The latter provide an opportunity for diaspora groups to take 
part in development and/or humanitarian activities such as health, education and 
relief services. In Somalia, for instance, these services have shown to transform the 
factors underpinning the continued suffering under the conflict. Other examples 
include the diaspora facilitation of reconciliation efforts at the local level (i.e. in 
the case of Somalia where support for the reconciliation between clashing clans 
through service delivery in strategic locations has brought together different clans 
and communities for interaction, sports and elders meetings).7 These examples 
confirm the observation that diaspora groups can function as simultaneous bridge-
builders and have the potential for reducing conflict by fostering constructive 
dialogue processes or contributing to positive economic developments through 
remitting money and knowledge (Zunzer 2004; Mohamoud 2005b). With a view 
to engage diaspora organisations as peacebuilding partners, however, it is 
important to differentiate between the types of activities they undertake. It is, in 
fact, essential that an organisation actually focuses on reconciliation, education, 
community and peacebuilding efforts. In most of the cases studied within the 
DIASPEACE project, diaspora organisations choose activities that are not directly 
or explicitly peacebuilding in nature and focus, instead, on forms of humanitarian 
and/or development assistance. This choice of engagement strategy is often 
related to the perception held by the diaspora of the conflict and of its own role. 
In some cases of Somali organisations covered by the DIASPEACE project, for 
instance, the conflict is perceived as being influenced or protracted to a large 
extent by external interferences (such as interventions by neighbouring countries), 
or the politics of the country of origin is seen as run by corrupted individuals. 
In these circumstances, the diaspora groups may feel that they do not have the 
means or the motivation to engage at that level and thus they chose to undertake 
very practical development work at the local level. Similarly among Ethiopian 
organisations, there is hardly any group with an explicit or exclusive focus on 
peacebuilding or peace consolidation. A number of groups, however, engage 
in the field of conflict resolution, reconciliation and human rights and can thus 
be considered to indirectly contribute to reconstruction and stabilisation in 
Ethiopia. Activities range from awareness raising in the field of human rights (e.g. 
conscientious objection), to conducting conflict research, to organising discussion 
events, to implementing peace and reconciliation projects at the community level in 
Ethiopia. While these forms of engagement may still allow diaspora organisations 
to contribute indirectly to peacebuilding processes, their activities must prove an 
6 The notion of social remittances according to Levitt entails not only “progressive” thinking, 
norms, behaviours, it is however important to note that the diaspora in fact can also be very 
“conservative” and regressive (i.e. against the modernisation of the country). 
7 Many examples of this kind have been encountered in the DIASPEACE study of Somali 
organisations based in the Netherlands and in Italy. Despite strong differences in the country 
of residence settings and organisational setup, these initiatives have proved to have a positive 
impact on the peace process in Somalia.
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awareness of the conflict-related dynamics they might address. Whilst refusing to 
declare an upfront peacebuilding focus, moreover, most diaspora groups perceive 
themselves as having an important role in contributing to the promotion of peace.
As mentioned above, diaspora can contribute indirectly to peacebuilding in the 
country of origin by engaging also in activities in the country of residence or at the 
transnational level. Diaspora organisations offer to their communities a setting in 
which individuals and groups are able to formulate their problems, articulate their 
interests and present them in different fora and at different levels to other actors in 
the countries of residence. The articulation of diaspora interest, for instance, often 
takes the form of lobbying which extends beyond the country of residence also 
to the international level. Diaspora networks have been noted to act as important 
facilitators of internal, inter-state, and worldwide political, cultural and economic 
connections. According to Sheffer, they are seen as “precursors of post-modern 
trans-state social and political systems” (Sheffer 2002, p. 245). The cross-country 
contacts established by diaspora are often based on personal networks and 
transnational links to branches in other countries. These efforts have the potentials 
for awareness creation on conflict issues, and drawing the attention of different 
actors, governments, and development agencies. The evidence of their impact, 
however, is always a subject of debate. As observed by Eva Østergaard-Nielsen 
“diaspora seldom make a government adopt a policy unless that policy is in the 
national interest of the country” (2006, p. 10). Such observations are critical for 
analysing the extent to which diasporas can be engaged at policy level and the 
extent to which such processes and inputs could translate into peacebuilding 
outcomes in the country of origin.
Diaspora networks, of course, involve relations not only with actors outside 
the diaspora, but also within the diaspora. At this level, diasporas can play a 
peacebuilding role within their own communities in the countries of residence 
by aggregating people on the basis of shared and common goals. Most 
of the groups investigated within DIASPEACE have been working primarily 
towards “immigrant politics” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003), undertaking activities 
to improve the social status of the community in the countries of residence. 
Before undertaking activities in the country of origin, in fact, it is important for 
the diaspora to obtain “recognition” and the fulfilment of basic rights in the 
country of residence. In all the countries covered by this study, it appears that 
the level of integration (or of recognition and rights) in the host society allows for 
different degrees of mobilisation towards activities targeting the country of origin. 
Moreover, although not directly aiming at peacebuilding, activities promoting 
the improvement of living conditions in the countries of residence can be said to 
have a unifying effect within the diaspora. These constructive attempts to create 
common identities and mobilise towards common goals (Axel 2004; Kleist 2007) 
therefore simultaneously have the effect of mitigating conflictual identities relating 
to the country of origin.8 Similar processes occur within the diaspora also at the 
transnational level. The DIASPEACE study has shown that the diaspora from the 
three Horn of Africa countries considered all have very broad networks operating 
transnationally. This is due to the fact that most of the refugees from these 
countries are widely dispersed in various locations in Africa, Middle East, Europe, 
North America and Australia. The transnational linkages that have been generated 
by this geographic dispersion offer critical connections for potential diaspora 
8 It has, however, also been observed that when the diaspora engages towards the country of 
origin, such as in the case of Somalia, fragmentary lines can also re-emerge.
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involvement in the country of origin. DIASPEACE field data has shown that a number 
of diaspora organisations have been able to develop close linkages with a number 
of likeminded organisations in other European countries and North America. Somali 
organisations based in Finland, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK have shown to be 
part of various transnational networks with basis in Somalia and focal points and 
affiliations in several countries in Europe, USA and Canada. One organisation even 
established contacts within the Horn of Africa through Kenya, in order to facilitate 
smooth operations with local partners in southern and central Somalia. Similarly, 
among the Ethiopian diaspora in Germany, the DIASPEACE research uncovered a 
number of organisations with transnational ties to other Ethiopian communities 
around the globe. This holds true especially for groups organised around ethnic 
identities. These transnational networks proved an ability to accumulate significant 
resources to be invested in development projects in Ethiopia, however research 
revealed very few concrete co-operation efforts between different groups at 
the project level. There are also groups who explicitly aim to foster dialogue 
processes among conflicting groups and parties by facilitating dialogue processes 
within the Ethiopian diaspora. Although the effort to invite conflicting parties 
to the discussion table was not always successful, these initiatives show the 
willingness and to some degree the ability to negotiate and overcome ideological 
differences and cleavages. Moreover, there is no real evidence of the impact 
that these intra-diaspora reconciliation efforts might have on political and social 
processes in the countries of origin. It can however be assumed that coalitions 
between different political fractions in the diaspora, for instance, might in fact 
have some influence on party politics or conflict proceedings in the countries 
of origin.9 The development of similar transnational linkages and activities that 
transcend different countries not only may lead to the mitigation of conflict and 
intra-group dialogue, but may also lead to greater potential for the mobilisation 
of various groups, while also allowing individual organisations to tap into broader 
experiences across several countries of residence. 
9 Examples of this nature have been encountered among political coalitions of Eritrean parties 
and movements in the near diaspora.
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Engaging diaspora organisations can be beneficial to various stakeholders in many 
ways. For the diaspora groups, it enhances their potentials for networking and 
viable contact establishment in the countries of residence, but also gives them the 
platform, capacities and resources which can enable them to effectively implement 
activities in the countries of origin. For the country of residence institutions, 
agencies and government, engaging the diaspora can provide a critical avenue 
for learning from the diasporas’ relevant activities, and valuable information 
from the country of origin, for their policy considerations. The positive aspects 
of diaspora engagement outlined above require however to be integrated with 
additional considerations on some of the challenges posed by involving diaspora 
in peacebuilding processes. 
Alongside structural factors relating to the countries of origin and of residence, 
as well as to the international level (Orozco 2005, p 5), factors relating directly to 
diaspora organisations and their capacities also play a significant role in framing 
the opportunities for diaspora engagement in peacebuilding initiatives and 
processes. As aptly put by Smith, in fact, the engagement of diasporas in conflict 
processes has to be assessed “by tracing not just the capacities of the diaspora 
(agency) but also the transnational opportunities available to it (structure)” (2007, 
p. 9). An analysis of the intervening structural factors goes beyond the scope of 
this paper, which aims at identifying relevant characteristics possessed specifically 
by diaspora organisations to be suitable peacebuilding partners. The latter will 
therefore be the main focus of this section. 
Before fully entering the discussion on the characters of individual diaspora 
organisations, it is worth mentioning that the first difficulty faced by third parties 
wishing to engage with diaspora from the Horn of Africa (and elsewhere) is the 
fact that accurate information on what activities they are actually undertaking is 
largely lacking. Fragmentation within the diaspora, coupled with the small scale 
of many of its initiatives mean that only those groups that are well established 
and engage in activities that are visible in the public domain are easy to identify 
and access. This lack of in depth knowledge and understanding of what the Horn 
of Africa diasporas are engaged in has, in turn, contributed to a lack of critical 
knowledge on their potentials. Few exceptions can be cited to this tendency, such 
as the ongoing discussion on the case of the Somali diaspora (Hansen 2007; 
Horst 2008; Kleist 2007 and 2008; Lindley 2007 and 2009), which however takes 
place more at an academic level rather than at a level that can inform policy and 
practice. Particularly in the case of diaspora originating from conflict areas, such 
as the case of many Horn of Africa countries, much of the interest in the countries 
of residence has focused, instead, on issues such as the legality or illegality 
of migrants (Lindahl 2008; Willen 2007), migration management (Piper 2006), 
integration (Bosswick and Heckmann 2006; Münz 2008) and diaspora links to 
conflicts (Koser 2003; Lyons 2004). 
Despite a lack of strong attention for this issue, in most of the countries of 
residence studied within DIASPEACE, diaspora organisations have been 
noted to engage in a number of activities that could immensely contribute to 
peacebuilding. In particular, they engage with each other within their respective 
communities, they mobilise their members for the purpose of visibility and they 
establish formal relations with institutions, development agencies and local 
authorities. The latter, of course, is easier in cases where diaspora activities and 
engagement frameworks are institutionalised. From such frameworks, influential 
networks tend to develop where diasporas are of sufficient size and concentration 
and have sufficient time to organise (Lyons 2006, p.5). Networking with country 
of residence actors is a two way process, which depends on the existing policies 
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and interest of the country of residence to engage its diaspora communities, as 
well as on the capacity and the level of professionalism of diaspora organisations 
themselves, which will be discussed next. As it has been put by de Haas, therefore, 
it is also important to question the role played by development actors in enhancing 
diaspora involvement. In his view, questions need to be asked about “what 
practical policy recommendations can be formulated so as to help and motivate 
development actors and migrant organisations in building mutual partnerships” (de 
Haas 2006, p. 5).
Although some of the structural factors just mentioned are key in defining the 
possibilities for diaspora engagement, it is important to recognise that “diasporas 
are not powerless victims of circumstances. Diasporas have agency, however 
limited” (Smith 2007, p. 15). The nature and type of diaspora organisations, however, 
poses some challenges in their successful engagement in peacebuilding activities. 
The already mentioned fragmentation within the diaspora poses the first challenge 
to the selection of relevant partner organisations. The diversity and complexity that 
characterise many diaspora communities not only make it difficult for an outsider 
to untangle their complex universe, but they may also hinder the possibilities for 
cooperation with country of residence institutions and development agencies. 
Fragmentation within the diaspora, in fact, can be related to previous or ongoing 
conflicts in the country of origin, which have spilled over into the diaspora (Lyons 
2006). To assess whether a diaspora organisation is capable of constructive 
engagement in peacebuilding, therefore, conceptual differentiations have to be 
made between the different groups that make up a diaspora community. It is 
thus important to recognise the heterogeneous nature of diasporas and to pay 
attention to the ways in which fragmentary lines are drawn within a given community 
on the basis of ethnicity, religion, gender, clan, profession and generation. In 
selecting a specific group for undertaking peace-building activities in the country 
of origin, institutions and development agencies unavoidably also “legitimise” 
this group to act, hence excluding others. Engaging diaspora groups, in fact, 
also means providing them with means and opportunities, which may have the 
counter-effect of offering resources to some, while creating new competitions and 
misunderstandings among others. In one recently investigated case regarding the 
Associazione Diaspora e Pace (ADEP, a network of Somali women’s associations 
acting in Italy), their interaction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been 
criticised as the dynamics just described were at work. One group was legitimised 
against others, which also translated into financial resources managed by a few, 
while the others felt excluded. From this and similar examples a significant lesson to 
be drawn is that it is important to take into account how an explicit and transparent 
criterion for the selection of certain groups must be established in order to avoid 
productive legitimisation of certain diaspora groups at the expense of others. In this 
sense, diasporas are not a neutral third party, but an actor with own interests, views 
and perceptions. This holds particularly true in sensitive conflict issues and must 
be taken into account by third parties wishing to identify suitable diaspora partners 
(Mezzetti and Guglielmo 2010).
On the basis of the considerations just made one might also question that 
diaspora organisations as such are, in fact, the most suitable actors to engage 
in peacebuilding. As observed in the case of Italy, participation of the Somali 
diaspora in peacebuilding processes in the country of origin took place at the 
individual level rather than through the associational dimension. At least two 
factors concurred in explaining this trend: 1) clan discourse, which is actually the 
general criterion of selection for delegates during the three last peace processes; 
2) the specific type of Somali associations in Italy. Insofar as clan has been chosen 
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as a constitutional element by the new Somali institutions, Somali diaspora 
associations have de facto been excluded from taking part in the peace process 
(Mezzetti and Guglielmo 2010). The danger of entirely excluding the diaspora from 
conflict resolution initiatives in the affected countries lies in the consequences 
of marginalising a critical constituency whose input has been significant for the 
sustainability of those communities experiencing difficulties brought about by 
conflict. The remittances sent back by the diaspora into these communities play 
a significant role in shaping the living conditions and other dynamics on the 
ground. As such, their constructive involvement in peace processes is an integral 
part of the solution even if some groups in the diaspora have also been behind 
the conflagrations in the countries of origin. In this context, it can be argued that 
any form of diaspora engagement for conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the 
Horn of Africa requires a critical look at the political processes in the concerned 
countries and how the diaspora can effectively make a contribution. With 
protracted conflicts as in the case of Somalia, or in Ethiopia and Eritrea where 
the existing governments are strong and are part of the previous and emerging 
frictions, the diaspora input could be mobilised through mechanisms that bring all 
the stakeholders on board. This requires developing frameworks and processes in 
which a constructive role of the diaspora is accepted as an element in the overall 
contribution to peacebuilding. 
Another series of restrictive factors for diaspora engagement pertain more closely 
to the features of diaspora organisations themselves. The resources that they are 
able to mobilise pose a particular challenge. Most activities engaged in by the 
diaspora are, in fact, purely voluntary in nature. This means that the time that is 
dedicated to them is often limited as individuals must first fulfil work and family 
commitments. Empirical data collected within the DIASPEACE project confirms 
that most diaspora organisations are small in size and that they face the continuous 
challenge of having sufficient – time and financial – resources to work efficiently, 
while members deal with personal everyday difficulties in the country of residence 
such as unemployment, economic hardships, social and family problems. 
The degree of continuity and stability of diaspora organisations is an additional 
important factor for consideration, that might help exclude from partnership 
spontaneous and short-lived initiatives. The latter often spring up in response to 
political, social or economic crises “at home”. Other groups, even with a very low 
degree of formalisation might well be firmly established and highly effective, even 
though they might not be officially registered. 
Another limiting factor relates to the difficulty to find a legitimised and trusted 
position (Vasanthakumar 2005), which hinders cooperation both with the 
authorities and with the respective diaspora communities in the country of 
residence. While the legitimacy of diaspora organisations begins in theory 
with formal registration with national authorities, in practice this may not 
automatically translate into ensuring financial and moral support from country of 
residence officials. This is often occasioned by the perceived “bad reputation” 
of diaspora organisations as there have been cases of money misuse and lack of 
accountability. Legitimising a position among the diaspora community, instead, 
relates to motivating people to get “on board” and to contribute to activities 
directed towards the country of origin, which in some cases may be difficult. 
Diaspora members, for instance, may have lost the hope of improving the 
situation in the country of origin. In a case like the one of Somalia, for instance, 
the length of the conflict situation may act as a dissuasive for people to wish to 
actively intervene. 
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Another important factor, which relates to the resources of particular diaspora 
groups, is their networking capacity with other affected stakeholders in the 
country of residence or through transnational linkages. In this regard migrants 
have become progressively more transnational in their orientations and can thus 
be simultaneously involved in two or more societies at the same time (Vertovec 
1999). Evidence provided in the previous section of this paper shows that in 
general the Horn of Africa diaspora groups have managed to network extensively 
at the transnational level. In the cases covered by the DIASPEACE research, in 
fact, diaspora organisations have proved to rely on these transnational networks 
in remitting money through globalised banking systems or informal channels and 
in carrying out fundraising for development or humanitarian purposes. This has 
allowed diaspora networks to undertake initiatives in the country of origin without 
depending on support coming from external actors. Although this should be 
indicated as a strength of diaspora organisations, the transnational reach of these 
initiatives may in fact pose a problem to the establishment of partnerships at the 
level of the country of residence on the basis of differences in scale and reach.
The diaspora understandings of the conflict and its local dynamics are another 
important factor that can challenge diaspora engagement. On the one hand, a clear 
understanding of the conflict and of the context in which it takes place represent 
an added value that the diaspora can contribute. On the other hand, however, it is 
also well known that diasporas tend to have rather romanticised views of the home 
country and that they are more inclined to adopt extreme positions (Anderson 1992; 
Skrbis 1999). The latter may be attributable to the fact that they do not directly 
face the outcome of actions undertaken in the country of origin, but also to the 
marginalisation they face in the country of residence (Demmers 2002; Østergaard-
Nielsen 2006). In general, the diaspora groups or organisations’ ability to read or 
understand the conflict beyond a mere local dimension may depend on different 
factors, namely: their capacity of being present in different locations of the home 
region either as a development actor or performing other functions within the local 
community; the leaders’ involvement and their historical background in national 
politics; the ability of establishing “strategic partnerships”; the associations’ 
mandates, especially when linked to the agendas of international organisations 
(Mezzetti and Guglielmo 2010).
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The research insight provided above confirms that diaspora organisations 
have the potential to be considered as prospective new actors in the field of 
peacebuilding. As suggested by Zunzer (2004), if sufficiently empowered the 
engagement of diasporas as collaborative partners in peacebuilding initiatives 
favours the development of win-win situations for both host and home societies. 
Their knowledge of the country and context, as well as their motivation represent 
valuable assets that could integrate the efforts already undertaken in the field of 
peacebuilding by governmental and non-governmental actors in Europe. Engaging 
diaspora in peacebuilding actions, however, also presents a number of challenges, 
some of which are outlined in the previous section. For partnerships between 
the diaspora and other external actors to be effective, in particular, migrant 
organisations should meet some basic requirements. This should be part of a 
process of negotiation, by which diaspora groups should be expected to meet 
given requirements, while third parties should also be prepared to adapt their ways 
and standards in order to favour the establishment of mutual collaboration. More 
specifically, a preliminary number of characteristics presented by organisations 
that are active in the field of reconciliation and peacebuilding were identified by 
the DIASPEACE project itself while setting sampling standards for the selection 
of case studies for further in depth research to be conducted.10 The research data 
later collected among the organisations selected, moreover, showed that a number 
of factors can shape and influence diaspora organisations’ ability to engage 
in peacebuilding constructively. This research-based insight into some of the 
limiting and enabling factors is therefore used here to suggest a set of key criteria 
that diaspora organisations should meet in order to qualify as potential partners 
in peacebuilding activities. Presented here in an order that is not indicative of 
their relative importance or priority, these criteria are proposed as preliminary 
elements to be taken into account by Governments in the countries of residence, 
International Agencies, NGOs and other third parties who wish to identify diaspora 
partners for their peacebuilding activities.
a) Transparency within the diaspora organisation
Transparency as a criterion relates to issues pertaining to the organisational 
structure and modes of governance, which must be clear and open. Legal 
registration of a diaspora organisation in the country of residence with the right 
authorities, for instance, constitutes a sign of transparency. The latter, however, 
can also be verified on the basis of the organisation’s internal structures and 
procedures, in particular as regards decision making processes. The establishment 
of frameworks for supervisory roles and oversight functions (as in the case of the 
nomination of a Board or other leadership positions within the organisation), for 
instance, indicate that diaspora organisations operate with clear rules and laid 
down procedures.
b) Inclusiveness of the diaspora organisation
The heterogeneous nature of many diaspora communities requires explicit 
attention to be paid to the issue of diversity and fragmentation within the various 
communities. The latter can be declined along ethnic, religious and/or gender 
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lines. Third parties need to identify ways of acknowledging this fragmentation 
and dealing with it constructively. For the purposes of effective engagement, third 
parties may seek for diaspora partners that can prove a commitment to being 
inclusive, regardless of existing differences within the community. This commitment 
can be sought in the organisation’s plans and in the mission or agenda for which 
the organisation was set up. This, however, may not always be a feasible option, 
as conflict situations in the country of origin may be reflected also in fragmentation 
and contrapositions among the diaspora. In these cases, it must be clear to third 
parties which particular diaspora constituency is represented by potential partner 
organisations. This, in fact, will result in the exclusion of certain sections of the 
diaspora from envisioned activities, an issue that becomes particularly sensitive in 
the case of engagement in the field of peacebuilding. 
c) Accountability within the diaspora organisation
The nature of accountability within diaspora organisations is critical for their 
engagement, in that it shows an active effort to show rigour in an organisation’s 
processes, procedures, records and audited reports. These activities and 
frameworks guarantee accountability and integrity in the management of the 
diaspora organisations’ affairs both to constituents and to supporting donors. 
That the latter should find accountability desirable is rather self-explanatory, 
however the role played by this virtue also within diaspora communities 
themselves should not be overlooked. Accountability is, in fact, a critical element 
for the building of trust within diaspora organisations, since lack of trust is 
recognised as one of the causes of fragmentation and conflict within diaspora 
communities. Lack of trust also hinders reconciliatory efforts in the country both 
of residence and of origin. Selecting groups on the basis of their accountability 
would therefore send the right signals and it is likely to encourage openness in the 
diaspora organisational management at all levels.
d) Cooperation with institutions/individuals in the country of residence
The nature and extent of cooperation with other relevant actors and institutions 
in the country of residence are important factors providing insight into the profile 
of diaspora organisations. This key criteria, which can be easily translated into 
measurable indicators,11 can reveal how diaspora organisations are embedded 
within the institutions, human rights and development actors in the country of 
residence and their ability to establish relevant networks for broader input in 
different areas of development and peacebuilding. These forms of cooperation, 
in fact, are critical for the sharing of knowledge and experiences that, in turn, 
can favour the incorporation of new perspectives and insights into peacebuilding 
policies and programmes. Moreover, cooperation with institutions and development 
organisations in the country of residence could serve as a starting point for these 
third parties to actively engage in the countries of origin of the diaspora, thus 
favouring the promotion of new initiatives.
e) Cooperation within the diaspora and transnational ties 
Besides diaspora interactions and cooperation in the countries of residence, 
contacts within the diaspora also represent a highly critical aspect in diaspora 
engagement. Firstly, contacts may give way to forms of collaboration of a 
11 Such as, for instance, the number of existing partners, the number of collaborations 
established, the attendance rate at key relevant events, etc.
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transnational nature. The research findings illustrated above, for instance, suggest 
that the more diaspora organisations are transnational and the more they are likely 
to succeed in their interventions. Reliance on a transnational web of contacts, 
in fact, enables them to mobilise resources and capacities more effectively to 
the advantage of activities implemented in the country of origin. Furthermore, 
transnational ties favour a greater visibility of diaspora activities. Secondly, forms 
of cooperation may be established within the diaspora with an ability to cut 
across internal divisions and contrasts. In these cases, collaboration becomes an 
indicator of the ability and willingness of a particular diaspora group to discuss, 
negotiate and overcome ideological, ethnic or religious differences and cleavages 
that might be at the basis of conflict situations in the country of origin.
f) The diaspora perceptions on peace and conflict in the country of origin
Diaspora perceptions on peace and conflict are another key criterion for diaspora 
engagement in peacebuilding. Taking into account these perceptions requires 
finding ways of assessing how the diaspora looks at the conflict situation in the 
country of origin. Such an endeavour cannot do without a solid understanding 
of the causes of conflict and its dynamics in a given country context. Because of 
the diversity in the nature of conflict situations, specific indicators will have to be 
elaborated on the basis of each country’s context. It is, however, essential that 
any chosen indicator should be able to recognise existing differences between 
the perceptions of those living in the country and the perceptions of the diaspora. 
Exposed to the effects of long distance, in fact, the latter tend to become rather 
simplistic and categorical in nature. Any chosen indicator, moreover, should also 
take into account the ways in which ongoing developments in the country of origin 
continue to shape the perceptions of conflict and peace within the diaspora. The 
diaspora’s perceptions, in fact, inform their choices of activities, therefore affecting 
the opportunity for effective engagement in any envisioned peacebuilding process.
g) The diaspora engagement strategies
The engagement strategies adopted by diaspora organisations are also an 
important criterion for selecting them as potential partners in peacebuilding. 
A suitable indicator should firstly cover the nature of the declared aims of the 
organisation, in order to assess the compatibility with the third party’s own aim, 
as well as relevance for the purposes of peace, reconciliation or community 
building. Moreover, the ways in which the organisation’s aims are then pursued 
in practice should also be subject to evaluation. The means chosen by the 
organisation should be explicitly peaceful and have the ability to challenge 
attitudes and identification patterns that have a potential to generate conflict. 
Finally, the nature of the specific activities undertaken and of their beneficiaries 
could also be taken into account in the overall assessment of adequate diaspora 
engagement strategies.
h) Continuity and sustainability of the diaspora organisation and its activities
Although several diaspora organisations exist in the respective countries of 
residence, many have been noted to exist only on paper, due to a lack of ability 
to translate their aims into concrete interventions. Few diaspora organisations, in 
fact, have the capacity to implement activities and to do so in a way that is stable 
over time. This statement affects the continuity and sustainability of diaspora 
organisations’ membership as well as activities. Many initiatives of individual 
diaspora members who bring personal motivation and resources become 
unsustainable when those individuals leave the organisation. This is reflected 
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in a frequent lack of continuity in the organisations’ activities in the countries of 
residence and even more so in the country of origin. In the latter, the potential for 
continuity and sustainability can be assessed by means of the resources available 
to the organisation on the ground. In particular, the nature of local partners and the 
type of collaborations established with them are key factors that should be taken 
into account.
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Drawing on the findings of earlier DIASPEACE research (Warnecke ed. 2010) and 
the discussion presented in this paper, several concluding points should be made. 
The DIASPEACE project, in fact, has so far offered valuable insights while also 
raising critical issues for consideration in the anticipation of engaging the Horn of 
Africa diaspora in order to tap into its peacebuilding potential. Some of the issues 
touched by this paper, moreover, also raise new questions for further research that 
should be anticipated here. 
The set of key criteria just illustrated aims at facilitating the selection of diaspora 
organisations with which third parties might wish to engage in conducting 
activities in the country of origin. Following the presentation of these criteria, 
some considerations need to be recalled, however, on their reach and limitations. 
It should be newly stressed that the criteria are not intended in normative terms, 
but wish to offer a few indications of relevant organisational traits that third parties 
might wish to take into account prior to establishing collaboration with diaspora 
groups. This non-normative nature is further strengthened by the fact that not all 
the suggested criteria may be relevant for all diaspora organisations. Transparency 
and accountability (criteria a and c), for instance, should be weighed particularly 
in the case of organisations that engage politically or that are organised along 
ethnic lines when the latter have played a role in the conflict situation. Similarly, 
the criterion of inclusiveness (b) should not be taken into account in the case of a 
women’s organisation, which presents a non-inclusive nature by definition. These 
considerations therefore require that the criteria listed in this paper should be 
analysed and adapted to each case with particular care, selecting those that might 
be relevant, excluding those that are not appropriate, and defining a weighting 
system able to attribute greatest importance to those criteria that address features 
that are particularly key in a given context.
It should also be noted that while some of the criteria apply more broadly to 
collaboration between diaspora and other actors for undertaking activities of 
various nature in the country or origin as well as of residence, others are more 
directly concerned with a specific engagement in the field of peacebuilding in 
home countries. The criterion relating to diaspora engagement strategies (g), for 
instance, is crucial in conditioning the effectiveness of potential collaborations 
in this field. The complexity and extreme diversity of the situations in the home-
country, however, together with the complexity and extreme diversity of diaspora 
organisations’ own interventions make this a challenging criterion to frame in 
practice. 
The translation of each criterion into measurable indicators will also require a good 
degree of case-specific adaptation, particularly for those criteria that are not easy 
to operationalise. The diaspora perceptions of peace and conflict in the country of 
origin (criterion f), for instance, are not only difficult to assess but they also require 
an implausible effort, on behalf of interested third parties, to understand the 
context in the country of origin in detail and to grasp the complexity of the conflict 
situation.
Lastly, no explicit distinction has been introduced in this paper between criteria 
that third parties might expect from their partners and criteria that might facilitate 
effective diaspora engagement in peacebuilding regardless of their degree of 
desirability among third parties. 
Alongside their limitations and the efforts required for their translation into 
specific indicators, it should also be stressed that these criteria are unable, 
alone, to ensure that collaboration with diaspora organisations leads to effective 
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engagement in peacebuilding. The factors taken into account in the elaboration 
of these criteria, in fact, only consider elements that are internal to the diaspora 
organisations themselves, whereas the DIASPEACE research has shown that also 
a number of factors that are external to diaspora organisations have a power to 
influence the success of their peacebuilding efforts. While some of these factors 
have been briefly recalled in this paper, their effects on successful diaspora 
initiatives and on effective third party collaboration with them in maintaining and 
promoting peace, go beyond the considerations contained in this paper.
The issues just raised call for further research to be conducted that could add 
to our current knowledge of some of the enabling and restricting factors to 
constructive diaspora engagement in peacebuilding processes. Some relevant 
areas of enquiry will be addressed by the DIASPEACE project under WP4, 
covering the institutional framework in which diaspora organisations operate in the 
countries of residence and enquiring into existing collaborations that are relevant 
for peacebuilding between diaspora organisations and other actors. Alongside 
providing examples of best practices and lessons learned, it is hoped that this new 
research may uncover which forms of collaboration prove to be more effective. 
Collaboration in itself, in fact, can take many forms and certain partnerships, as 
well as given fields of intervention, may favour effective diaspora engagement in 
peacebuilding better than others.
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